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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that

Ms. Mezenen had not cohabitated with a member of the opposite sex
and that, consequently, Mr. Mezenen was not entitled to a refund of
alimony previously paid under temporary orders. The trial court's
decision regarding cohabitation presents a mixed question of law
and fact; the appellate court will defer to the trial court's
findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous, but will
review

its ultimate decision

for correctness.

Pendleton v.

Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah Ct.App. 1996).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing Ms.

Mezenen to amend her Complaint to add a claim for attorney's fees
during the course of the trial.
is an abuse of discretion.

The standard of appellate review

Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d

86 (Utah 1992).
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by awarding Ms.

Mezenen her attorney fees and costs.
review is an abuse of discretion.
(Utah Ct.App. 1994).

1

The standard of appellate

Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1993).

See Addendum A for a

complete recitation of that section.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp. Vol. 1995).

See Addendum

A for a complete recitation of that section.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Course of Proceedings.
Linda Mezenen ("Ms. Mezenen") filed for divorce on September

2, 1994, to dissolve her thirteen year marriage to Kelly Mezenen
("Mr. Mezenen").

The case was tried before Judge Frank G. Noel in

the Third Judicial District Court on January 30 and 31, 1996, and
May 2 0 and 21, 1996.

The court entered its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce on September 5, 1996. The
Decree of Divorce provided for the following:
1.

Ms. Mezenen was not awarded any alimony or marital

support.
2.

Mr. Mezenen was not entitled to a refund of alimony

previously paid under the temporary orders, as his claim that Ms.
Mezenen had engaged in cohabitation with a member of the opposite
sex was denied.
3.

Mr. Mezenen was awarded a lot in Duchesne, Utah, as his

sole and separate property, two vehicles, various personal items,
a Certificate of Deposit in the amount of $13,000.00, all right,
2

title, and interest in Kelly's Excavating, LLC, the parties1
marital residence on Bagpiper Circle, and one-half of personal
loans due and owing to the parties.
4.

Ms. Mezenen was awarded her vehicle, various personal

property, a New Haven building

lot acquired by the parties,

$12,700.00 as her share of the equity in the parties1 marital
residence, less $5,800.00 representing Mr. Mezenenfs pre-marital
funds used as a down payment, one-half of personal loans due and
owing to the parties, and the amount of $64,900.00 payable from Mr.
Mezenen to equalize the property award.
5.

Both parties were ordered to pay all separate debts

incurred since September of 1994.
6.

Both parties were ordered to pay their own costs and

attorney's fees; however, Mr. Mezenen was ordered to pay to Ms.
Mezenen $10,000.00 in attorney's fees and $513.00 in costs.
On October 2, 1996, Mr. Mezenen filed his Notice of Appeal.
On October 8, 1996, Ms. Mezenen filed her Notice of Cross Appeal.
B.

Statement of Facts.
1.

The parties began residing together in the same home in

July of 1986.

(Exhibit A, I 3; Tr. Vol. I, p. 12; Tr. Vol. Ill,

p. 542) .

3

2.

The parties were married in November, 1989, and divorced

on September 5, 1996, a marriage of approximately seven years.
(Exhibit A, f 5; Tr. Vol. I, p. 22).
3.

At the time of trial, Mr. Mezenen and Ms. Mezenen were

both 34 years of age.
4.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 3; Tr. Vol. II, p. 536).

There were no children born as the issue of the marriage.

However, Ms. Mezenen has two children from previous relationships.
Mr. Mezenen has one child from a prior marriage.

(Exhibit A, f 2;

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 543-544).
5.

The parties decided to form an excavation business,

Kelly's Excavating, LLC, in February of 1992. The business began
as a sole proprietorship, but became a limited liability company in
1994.

(Exhibit A, f 10; Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 555, 559).
6.

Ms. Mezenen worked for Sports Trax Kawasaki from 1991 to

February, 1995, on both a part-time and full-time basis.

She also

worked a few hours a week at the parties' business, Kelly's
Excavating, LLC, doing clerical work.

(Exhibit A, f 9; Tr. Vol. I,

pp. 6-7) .
7.

The court found that Ms. Mezenen was engaged

in a

training program with Ames Construction which would allow her to
provide for her own support without any alimony from Mr. Mezenen,
which she did not seek in any event.

4

Consequently, permanent

alimony was not awarded.

(Exhibit A, ff 14, 15; Exhibit B, f 2;

Tr. Vol. I, p. 101).
8.

The court effected an equitable distribution of assets,

which Mr. Mezenen does not contest on this appeal.

(Exhibit B, ff

6-10; Exhibit A, ff 22, 24-31, 34). The court also ordered that
the parties be awarded their separate pre-marital property and
property acquired since the separation with their separate funds,
and

that

they

separation.
9.

separately

assume

debts

incurred

since their

(Exhibit A, f 29; Exhibit B, ff 5, 6, and 13).

Prior to trial, Mr. Mezenen was ordered to pay Ms.

Mezenen temporary alimony in the amount of $1,200.00 per month.
(Exhibit A, f 16; Tr. Vol. I, p. 69; Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 604).
10.

All such alimony payments were in fact made.

(Exhibit A,

f 16; Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 604).
11.

Prior to the parties' separation, M&. Mezenen became

acquainted with Mr. Robert Grumwald, who was employed by Ames
Construction, and worked primarily in Nevada, Idaho, and Utah.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 112-113).
12.

The court found that Mr. Grumwald and Ms. Mezenen were

not cohabitating and, consequently, Mr. Mezenen was not entitled to
a refund of alimony previously paid Ms. Mezenen under the temporary
orders.

(Exhibit A, ff 17-20); Exhibit B, ff 3-4(|) . The court made

5

this finding despite the fact that, subsequent to the parties'
separation, but prior to their divorce:
(a)

Mr.

Grumwald

overnight periods.
(b)

Mr.

stayed

in Ms. Mezenen's

home

for

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 116);
Grumwald

and

Ms. Mezenen

traveled

together

outside the State of Utah, and went on camping trips within the
state.

(Exhibit A, f 17; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 128, 117-120, 133-137);
(c)

Mr. Grumwald

and Ms. Mezenen

engaged

in

sexual

intercourse, when Mr. Grumwald was residing in Ms. Mezenen's home
and when they traveled together.

(Exhibit A, f 19; Tr. Vol. I, pp.

118-119, 125);
(d)
purchased

some

while

residing

groceries

performed household

for

with

Ms.

the

home,

Mezenen,
assisted

Mr.

Grumwald

in

cooking,

chores, helped Ms. Mezenen's children with

their homework, attended teacher's conferences with Ms. Mezenen,
used the utilities, including the telephone, had free access to Ms.
Mezenen's
garage.

residence,

and

(Exhibit A, f 19;
(f)

stored

snowmobiles

in Ms.

Mezenen's

Tr. Vol. I, pp. 123-124, 126-127); and

Mr. Mezenen observed Mr. Robert Grumwald and his

vehicles at Ms. Mezenen's residence, which is approximately one and
one-half blocks from Mr. Mezenen's residence, on various overnight
occasions in the summer of 1995.

(Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 607).
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13.

Furthermore, Mr. Grumwald's twenty-two year old daughter

lived with Ms. Mezenen in her residence in May and June, 1995,
without paying any rent to Ms. Mezenen.
14.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 130-131).

The court granted Ms. Mezenen's Motion to Amend her

Complaint to add a claim for attorney's fees, despite the fact that
such motion was not made until mid-trial.
15.

(Exhibit A, J 21).

The court found that Ms. Mezenenfs Motion to Amend her

Complaint to add a claim for attorney's fees was proper based upon
Mr. Mezenen's alleged "concealment of assets."
16.

^Exhibit A, f 21).

The court's finding that Mr. Mezenen had concealed assets

was based upon the testimony of Ms. Donna Chatwin, who previously
had been involved in a relationship with Mr. Mezenen.

(Exhibit A,

1 21).
17.

The court found that the fees incurred by Ms. Mezenen's

counsel in connection with his efforts to determine the assets of
the business allegedly concealed by Mr. Mezenen in the sum of
$10,000.00 were "reasonable," despite the fact that the court made
no specific findings regarding the reasonableness of the fees,
plaintiff's need for payment of such fees, or defendant's ability
to pay.
18.

(Exhibit A, f 21).
The court also awarded Ms. Mezenen costs in the amount of

$513.00, for the deposition of Mr. Mezenen and the filing fee.
Such award was also based upon Mr. Mezenen's alleged concealment of
7

assets, despite the fact that Ms. Mezenen did not file her Motion
to Amend her Complaint until well after Mr. Mezenen's deposition
had been taken.

(Exhibit A, f 16; Exhibit B, f 21).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The trial
respects.

court

clearly

abused

its discretion

in three

First, the court's finding regarding cohabitation is

blatantly erroneous, in light of the evidence presented, including
Ms. Mezenen's own testimony.

Ms. Mezenen herself testified that

Mr. Grumwald spent the night in her home on a number of occasions,
that the two traveled together and engaged in sexual intercourse,
that he helped with household chores, shared meals, assisted with
her children, and stored vehicles in her garage.

This evidence is

plainly sufficient to support a finding of cohabitation under Utah
law.

Consequently, the court was required, under U.C.A. § 30-3-5,

to order a refund of alimony previously paid Ms. Mezenen during the
period of cohabitation.
Second, the court clearly abused its discretion in allowing
Ms. Mezenen to amend her Complaint to add a claim for attorney's
fees midway through the trial.
untimely,

it significantly

Such amendment was not only

prejudiced Mr. Mezenen's right to

examine Ms. Mezenen's counsel regarding such fees.
Finally, the court's award of attorney's fees and costs is
improper, both as to entitlement and amount.
8

The court made

absolutely no finding regarding Ms. Mezenen's need for such fees,
Mr. Mezenen's
requested

ability

fees,

all

to pay, or the reasonableness
of which

are

required

under

of the

Utah

law.

Furthermore, the court's award of costs incurred in connection with
Mr. Mezenen's deposition is patently inequitable, as the deposition
was completed well before Ms. Mezenen amended her complaint or
raised any claim regarding concealment of assets.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
FINDING THAT MS, MEZENEN DID NOT ENGAGE IN
COHABITATION, DESPITE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
TO THE CONTRARY,
The trial court's finding that Ms. Mezenen did not engage in
cohabitation is startling, and patently erroneous, in light of the
evidence presented at trial regarding the details of Ms. Mezenen"s
relationship with Mr. Grumwald.

Under applicable Utah law, the

uncontroverted

was

testimony

which

presented

is

more

than

sufficient to support a finding of cohabitation; in fact, it is
difficult

to

imagine

a

clearer-cut

case

of

cohabitation.

Consequently, Mr. Mezenen is entitled to a refund of alimony he
previously paid under the trial court's temporary orders.

9

In Sigg v. Siaa. 905 P.2d 908 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this Court
set forth the standard for a finding of cohabitation under Utah
Code Ann- § 30-3-5(6) (1995).

The Court noted:

[i]n Utah, a party's obligation to pay alimony to a
former spouse is terminated upon a showing of
"cohabitation," which means the former spouse is residing
with a person of the opposite sex and engaging in sexual
contact with that person . . . [c]ommon residency means
"the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider
their principal domicile for more than a temporary or
brief period of time. Sexual contact means participation
in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to
that generally existing between husband and wife."
Id. at 917

(citing Haddow v. Haddowr

707 P. 2d 669, 672 (Utah

1985) ) .
This Court further found that, where Ms. Sigg and the alleged
cohabitant possessed separate condominiums in the same condominium
complex, but "had a sexual relationship, shared living expenses,
had open access to each other's condominiums, ate together and
shared food expenses, kept clothing in the same condominium, [and]
used the same furniture . . . ."
warranted.

a finding of cohabitation was

The Court made this finding despite the fact that Ms.

Sigg contested whether or not the couple regularly shared food and
living expenses, or kept food at the same condominium, noting that
"the weight of the evidence supports the finding of
cohabitation . . . ."

Id. at 918.

See Wacker v. Wackerr 668 P.2d

533 (Utah 1983) (evidence supported finding of cohabitation where

10

the plaintiff and cohabitant resided together and engaged in a
sexual relationship, despite the plaintiff's assertions that the
two were merely "sharing expenses").
In Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah Ct. App. 1996),
this Court held that a finding of cohabitation was warranted on
strikingly similar facts to those at hand.

The alleged cohabitant

stayed with Ms. Pendleton in her home "ninety percent of the time"
while he was in town, despite the fact that his job required
substantial travel out of state.

Furthermore, he came and went at

will, and ate almost all of his meals with Ms. Pendleton while he
was in town.

Id. at 161. Consequently, a finding of cohabitation

was warranted.
Here, Ms. Mezenen's own testimony is more than sufficient to
support, and frankly mandates, a finding of cohabitation.

Ms.

Mezenen admitted that Mr. Grumwald stayed in her home for overnight
periods during 1995 when he was in the state of Utah, that the two
traveled together outside the State of Utah on numerous trips which
he financed, went on camping trips within the state, and engaged in
sexual intercourse.

Furthermore, while residing with Ms. Mezenen,

Mr. Grumwald performed various household tasks obviously indicative
of his position as a resident, rather than a guest.

He purchased

groceries on occasion and assisted with cooking and household
chores.

Significantly, he also helped Ms. Mezenen's children with
11

their homework and attended teacher's conferences with Ms. Mezenen.
He used the utilities, including the telephone at will, and had
free access to Ms. Mezenen's residence, where he stored snowmobiles
and other vehicles. Additionally, Mr. Grumwald's daughter lived at
her residence without charge for two months during 1995.
In

light

of the prevailing

standards

for

a finding of

cohabitation under Utah law, and the substantial uncontroverted
testimony which was presented on this issue, it is difficult to
understand how any finding other than a finding of cohabitation
Consequently, the trial courtfs finding is

could be reached.

patently erroneous, and should be reversed.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
MEZENEN HER ATTORNEY'S FEES.
A.

AWARDED

MS.

The Trial Court Erred by Granting Ms. Mezenenvs Motion to
Amend her Complaint to add a Claim for Attorney's Fees
Mid-Trial, Despite Substantial Prejudice to Mr. Mezenen.

In her Verified Complaint for Divorce, not only did Ms.
Mezenen

fail

to

request

an

award

of

attorney's

fees,

she

affiritiatively sought an order requiring each party to bear their
own fees and costs.

Despite this failure to request fees, the

trial court granted Ms. Mezenen1s Motion, filed mid-trial, to amend
her Complaint in clear deviation from prevailing standards of Utah
law.

Allowing Ms. Mezenen to add a new and distinct claim at such

12

a late date operated to substantially prejudice Mr, Mezenen's
rights, particularly since his counsel did not have an opportunity
to conduct any discovery or examination regarding the necessity and
reasonableness of such fees.
Amendment of pleadings is governed by Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a)1.

In Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P. 2d 455

(Utah 1983), the Supreme Court of Utah noted:
[a] primary consideration that a trial judge must take into
account in determining whether leave [to amend] should be
granted is whether the opposing side would be put to
unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for which
he has not had time to prepare.
Id. at 464.

See Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc. , 786 P.2d

1350 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) cert denied 795 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1990)
(trial court must consider whether parties have adequate notice to
meet new issues and whether any party receives an unfair advantage
or disadvantage from a leave to amend).
In determining the propriety of a motion to amend a complaint
on the eve of, or during, trial, Utah courts have uniformly held
that the potential for severe prejudice to the adverse party weighs

1

Rule 15(a) provides "fa] party may amend his pleading once
as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading
is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave to
amend shall be freely given when justice so requires."
13

heavily against amendment.

In Girard v. Applebyf 660 P.2d 245

(Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme Court noted that Rule 15(a) "is to be
applied with less liberality when the amendments are proposed
during or after trial, rather than before trial."

Id. at 248. In

Girard, the court found that the plaintiff's motion to amend its
complaint to introduce "new and different causes of action" on the
day of trial was properly denied, particularly in light of the
potential disadvantage faced by defendants.

Id. at 248.

See

Hein's Turkey Hatcheriesr Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 470
P. 2d

257

(Utah

1970)

(an

amended

answer

presented

at

the

commencement of trial was properly excluded); Staker v. Huntington
Cleveland Irrigation Co.r 664 P. 2d 1188 (Utah 1983) (trial court
was well within its discretion in denying defendant's motion to
amend

answer

on the day of trial to add

a new

statute of

limitations defense).
Here, Ms. Mezenen failed to raise any claim for attorney's
fees until mid-trial. Consequently, Mr. Mezenen had no opportunity
to conduct any discovery regarding the reasonableness or necessity
of such fees.

In fact, Mr. Mezenen had absolutely no reason to

believe that any inquiry into amount or reasonableness of fees was
even relevant, given the fact that Ms. Mezenen affirmatively sought
an order requiring each party to bear their own fees and costs in
her

Complaint.

Any

claim

of
14

attorney's

fees requires some

investigation regarding the number of hours spent on the case, the
work performed, the efficiency of the attorneys involved, and other
factors2. The mid-trial amendment introducing this issue virtually
ensured that Mr. Mezenen would be unable to conduct this discovery.
He was forced to defend against a claim with no information.

It is

difficult to imagine a clearer showing of prejudice.
B.

The Court's Order Regarding Attorney's Fees Does Not
Address the Considerations Required by Utah Law

2

In fact, such a claim requires investigation and
consideration of factors such as the following: "(1) [w]hat legal
work was actually performed?; (2) how much of the work performed
was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter?; (3)
is the attorneys1 billing rate consistent with the rates
customarily charged in the locality for similar services?; (4) are
there circumstances which require consideration of additional
factors, including those listed in the code of professional
responsibility." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P. 2d 985, 990
(Utah 1988).
Furthermore, Rule 1.5 of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct requires consideration of:
a.
The time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;
b.
The likelihood, if apparent to the client of the
acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;
c.
The fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar legal services;
d.
The amount involved and the results obtained;
e.
The time limitations imposed by the client or by
the circumstances;
f.
The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
g.
The experience, reputation and ability of the
lawyer or lawyers performing the service; and
h.
Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
15

Based upon Ms. Mezenen's mid-trial amendment of her Complaint,
the trial court ordered Mr. Mezenen to pay $10,000.00 in attorney's
fees and $513.00 in costs incurred by Ms. Mezenen, despite the fact
that it made no finding whatsoever regarding Ms. Mezenen's need,
Mr. Mezenen's ability to pay, or the reasonableness of the fees.
This order does not conform to the requirements of Utah law, which
compels consideration of such factors.
Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-3-3 allows a court in a divorce action to
order one party to pay the attorney's fees of the other party.

In

Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court listed
the factors to be considered in determining the propriety of an
attorney's fee award.

"The award must be based on evidence of the

financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other
spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees."

Id.

at 493.
In determining the reasonableness of the requested fees, a
court

may

consider

"the

difficulty

of

the

litigation,

the

efficiency of the attorneys, the reasonableness of the number of
hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged

in the

locality, the amount involved in the case and the result attained,
and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved."
at 493-94.
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Id.

Here, the court entered a fee award in Ms. Mezenen's favor
based upon Mr. Mezenen's alleged concealment of assets. There are
two fundamental flaws with that proposition.

First, the court

found that the fees incurred by Ms. Mezenen's counsel in connection
with his efforts to determine "all of the assets of the business"
in the sum

of

$10,000.00 were

"reasonable." This conclusory

assertion is insufficient to support an award of fees under Utah
law, which requires consideration of the reasonableness of the
fees, plaintiff's need for payment of such fees, and defendant's
ability to pay.

The court made no findings whatsoever regarding

those factors.

In fact, it is impossible to discern from the

court's Findings whether or not need and ability ever entered into
the court's consideration; rather, it appears that the award was
entered solely on the basis of Mr. Mezenen's alleged concealment of
assets.
Utah appellate courts have not hesitated to reverse trial
court decisions which do not properly employ consideration of these
factors.

In Rappleye v. Rappleyer 855 P. 2d 260 (Utah Ct. App.

1993), this Court reversed an award of attorney's fees where the
trial court's findings failed to demonstrate that the award was
arrived at after consideration of the relevant factors.

See First

Sec. Servs. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding

17

that

all

factors

must

be

given

careful

consideration

in

determination of any attorney's fee award).
The second problem with the court's award is the fact that it
is based entirely upon Mr. Mezenen's alleged concealment of assets.
The court based the award entirely on such alleged concealment, and
awarded Ms. Mezenen costs in the amount of $513.00, for the
deposition of Mr. Mezenen and the transcript.

However, Ms.

Mezenen's Motion to Amend her Complaint was filed mid-trial, well
after Mr. Mezenen's deposition of September 29, 1995, had been
taken.

The finding of concealment was based upon the trial

testimony of Donna Chatwin, who previously did some work for Mr.
Mezenen at his business.

The trial court's award of costs and

fees, then, is even more insupportable; the deposition of Mr.
Mezenen was taken well before Ms. Chatwin presented her testimony,
which

supported

concealment.

the

trial

court's

determination

of

alleged

Any investigation on the part of Ms. Mezenen's

counsel regarding alleged concealment, which was based on Ms.
Chatwin's trial testimony, could not have included the deposition
of Mr. Mezenen, which took place months before the trial.
In sum, the trial court's award to Ms. Mezenen of $10,000.00
in attorney fees and $513.00 in costs is completely insupportable.
The

trial

court

utterly

failed

to

employ

any

whatsoever of the factors mandated by Utah law.
18

consideration

This failure is

grounds for reversal in itself. Furthermore, the court entered its
award because of Mr. Mezenen's alleged concealment, based on Ms.
Chatwin's testimony, which was not even presented

until the

"investigation" by Ms. Mezenen's attorney had already taken place.
Consequently, the trial court's attorney's fee award should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
The

trial

court's

decision

insupportable in three respects.
cohabitation

during the period

is

blatantly

erroneous

and

First, the court found that
of temporary

support had not

occurred, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, including
Ms. Mezenen's own testimony.

A clearer showing of cohabitation,

under Utah law, is difficult to imagine.

Mr. Mezenen is entitled

to a refund of alimony paid under the temporary orders.
Second, the trial court improperly allowed Ms. Mezenen to
amend

her

prejudice.

Complaint

mid-trial, to Mr. Mezenen's

significant

By allowing Ms. Mezenen to add a claim for attorney's

fees at that late date, the trial court deprived Mr. Mezenen of any
opportunity for reasonable investigation and examination regarding
the work done, reasonableness, and necessity of the fees incurred.
This is exactly the result that Rule 15(a) seeks to avoid.
Finally, the fee award contains absolutely no consideration of
the factors required by Utah law.
19

These factors are not advisory,

they are mandatory upon trial courts. By failing to consider these
factors, the trial court entered an insupportable award. The trial
court's Findings regarding cohabitation, amendment, attorney's fees
and costs should be reversed, and Mr. Mezenen awarded his fees and
costs.
DATED: July 17, 1997,
CAMPBELL 18?ACK & SESSIONS

/ /.A
CLARK W. SESSIONS
DEAN C. ANDREASEN
KRISTINE EDDE
Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee
Kelly Mezenen
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LINDA MEZENEN,
Plaintiff/Appellee/
Cross Appellant,
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Tab A

F»\???!STWCTC«UBT
•"•'•strict

SEP Oo 1996

CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215
Telephone: (801) 537-5555

Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LINDA MEZENEN,
Plaintiff,
v.

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 944903679 DA

KELLY MEZENEN,
Judge Frank G. Noel
Defendant.
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial pursuant
11

to notice before the undersigned, one of the Judges of the aboveentitled

Court commencing on January 30, 1996 and continuing

thereafter on January 31, 1996, May 20, 1996 and May 21, 1996. The
Plaintiff Linda Mezenen appeared in person and by and through her
jiattorney Randall Gaither. The Defendant Kelly Mezenen appeared in
i!

hperson and by and through h i s attorney Clark W. Sessions.

I!

The

II Court heard and considered the testimony of the parties, various
iI

!jwitnesses, including expert witnesses, received and considered
i[

'documentary evidence and heard the arguments and statements of
i j

!

[1counsel. The Court having fully considered the matter and having
[ issued its Memorandum Decision on May 29, 1996 now makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. ' The Court finds that the Plaintiff and Defendant were
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah for a period in excess
11 of three (3) months prior to the commencement of the above-entitled
action.
2.

The Court finds that no children were born as the issue

I of the marriage of the parties nor are any expected and that the
parties have children from prior marriages.
j

3.

The Court finds that the parties became acquainted with

jjeach other and moved into the same residence and used one checking
| jaccount for their mutual benefit in approximately the summer of

il
I j 1986 and that during that time the Plaintiff was unemployed, on
| public assistance and housing, and had children from a previous
! i

;;marriage and relationship.
The Court further finds that the
iI
: :Defendant was employed as a mechanic and heavy equipment operator
Hand had previous experience in the operation, maintenance and
jirepair of automobiles and construction equipment from his early
j j years as a teenager growing up in a farming environment in eastern
i!
;!Utah.

Defendant had a child from a previous marriage which the

!;plaintiff cared for during the day.

At that time the Defendant

i moved into a residence which the Plaintiff was renting while on
;!public housing he started to make payments out of his checking
,»account for the rental payments which were subsidized by public
'housing assistance. The parties were able to save money on housing
i

2

because of the low housing payment that the Plaintiff had at that
time until they purchased the Bagpiper residence.
4.

The Court finds that the parties dated each other and

!spent time with each other both in the Roosevelt/Duchesne area and
in Salt Lake County culminating in the parties7 moving in together
in 1989.

The Court further finds that during that period, the

Plaintiff was still on welfare and unemployed whereas the Defendant
was employed as a heavy equipment operator on the Jordanelle Dam

i
I project in Wasatch County, State of Utah.
I
5.
The Court finds that the parties were thereafter married
i

'on November 4, 1989 in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and resided
I
I together as husband and wife until their separation in September
I
1.1994.
i

J'

6.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff brought into the

', parties' relationship and marriage an automobile, pots, pans,
] cooking utensils, a couch and her personal effects and wearing
i

< japparel.
j

7.

The Court finds that the Defendant brought into the

t parties' relationship a Certificate of Deposit in both parties
i names which he received as the result of an inheritance which
i

appreciated to the approximate sum of $13,000 and which is being
! held at First Security Bank as collateral for the purchase of
i certain equipment in Kelly's Excavating, LLC.

The Court finds in

addition that the Defendant had a house trailer which was sold, a
lot in Duchesne, cash, various tools and equipment including
3

mechanics tools and other equipment and implements used in the
construction business generally.
I

8.

The Court finds that the parties acquired a residence and

real property on Bagpiper Circle in Salt Lake County, State of Utah
I and that the Defendant paid from his pre-marital funds the sum of
$5,800.00 as part of the down payment for the marital residence
which the Court finds should be returned to the Defendant.
!

9.

The Court finds that during the course of the parties'

•marriage, the Plaintiff worked at various part-time jobs including
iSports Trax, the manufacture and sale of various handicraft works

i
!

and Kelly's Excavating, LLC a few hours per week doing principally
'clerical and accounting work. The Court further finds that since

I

| the parties' separation in the fall of 1994, Plaintiff has had
'.'virtually no contact with Kelly's Excavating, LLC and that her
11
.
....
| J duties and responsibilities were assumed and discharged during that
I jperiod by the Defendant based upon Court order that stated "The
[I Defendant is permitted to operate the business jointly owned by the
! i

I parties as he has done historically.

The Defendant shall not

i

; dispose of any asset of the business other than in the ordinary
j!course of business without court order or the consent of the
! .Plaintiff."
| ;

!!

i i;
!

10.

The Court finds that during 1992, the Defendant and

;iPlaintiff, jointly determined to form an excavation business which
i'

I;they started as a sole proprietorship but which was later converted
i'

i to a Utah limited liability company and further that each of the
i i

II
! i

4

parties owned a fifty percent (50%) interest in that business.
Additionally,

the

Court

finds

that

the

business

of Kelly's

Excavating, LLC since its inception has grown significantly and in
particular

that

the

business

has

acquired

various vehicles,

construction equipment, inventory, tools and equipment, all as
detailed on Defendant's exhibits offered through Defendant's expert
Merrill Norman, principally Exhibit D-18.
11.

The Court finds that the Defendant was and is responsible

for securing customers for Kelly's Excavating, LLC, negotiating
i

!construction contracts, negotiating financing arrangements with
i

11various lenders, that no advertising of the business has been

I;
jI undertaken and specifically that there is no telephone listing,

|j
jl telephone book or similar advertising and that the business is
j;dependent upon the Defendant and his construction skills and
11 expertise for its successful operations.

The Court finds in

! iaddition that the Defendant works 12 to 14 hours per day, most
jj

;i often for a period of seven days each week and that when weather
i i

!

impacts

excavation,

the

Defendant

works

m

maintaining

and

'.•repairing business equipment and vehicles which the Court finds are
i adequately maintained.
12. The Court finds that Kelly's Excavating, LLC conducts its
i

libusiness principally from the residence of the Defendant and an
^adjacent shop as well as a vacant lot known as the Bagley property
•'on which
;

is located

a storage trailer, inventory, parts and

equipment that belong to the business.
5

Further, the Court finds

I that no charges were made by the Defendant to the business for the
use of heat, electricity and other utilities of the Defendant which
were used.by the business.
13.

The

Court

finds that

in the

forepart

of

1994, the

business paid the Defendant $2,000.00 per month as and for wages
and salary and that in order for the Plaintiff to have sufficient
I earnings to enable her to claim her children as exemptions and
[deductions for income tax purposes, there was a shift of the
I$2,000.00 per month salary to the Plaintiff and the Defendant
;1received no direct salary from the business thereafter based upon

IIjI the

temporary order of the court which permitted the Defendant a

ji

idraw and the Plaintiff $1,200.00 in alimony in lieu of the draw
jiwhich she requested.
Ii

II

14.

The Court finds that during the latter part of 1995, the

i!Defendant made the decision to close the business of Kelly's
i ;

!'Excavating, LLC and to become employed in the construction industry
i '

j' for others and further that he could earn from such employment
||

|! $18.00 to $24.00 per hour plus benefits, including life and health
I!
;! insurance, which benefits Defendant did not receive through Kelly's
j;Excavating, LLC. The Court finds in addition that given the duties
j and responsibilities of the Defendant in the operation of the
1

business, and his experience, a reasonable salary for the Defendant

:;would approximate $72,000 per year.
j •'

r

15.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff is currently engaged

; in a training program with Ames Construction that she is able to
i

!

provide for her own support and maintenance without contribution
from the Defendant and that she seeks no alimony or other marital
support

from

him.

The

Court

finds

in

addition,

that the

expectation of the Plaintiff upon completion of her training
program is that she will receive a fairly significant pay increase
at her new job and position.

In addition, the Court finds that

each of the parties are in good health and suffer from no physical
or mental impairment that would prevent them from earning a living.
16.

The Court finds that the Defendant was ordered to pay to

the Plaintiff as 'and for alimony on a temporary basis the sum of
if$1,200.00 per month and that certain of the alimony payments were

j
| made directly
!
1

by Kelly's

Excavating, LLC which the parties'

I accounting experts adjusted. The Court further finds that the
h
MDefendant is current in his alimony payments through the date of
i;
11 trial and that the parties agreed in the Fall of 1995 that the
!;Defendant could increase his salary from the business to $4,000.00
jjper month in consideration of which the business would continue at
least through trial.
17.

The Court finds that in approximately December of 1994,

the Plaintiff became acquainted with one Robert Grumwald and that
during the period January 1995 through the commencement of trial,
!!the Plaintiff traveled to the midwest with Mr. Grumwald on at least
I •

jitwo occasions, once together and once with the Plaintiff and her
family for the purpose of meeting Mr. Grumwald's family; that Mr.
: Grumwald paid for the transportation costs of the Plaintiff and her
7

I!family as well as lodging and meals during those trips and further
that those parties engaged in sexual intercourse while on those
I trips. The Plaintiff, Linda Mezenen, prior to meeting Mr. Grumwald
had purchased in her own name a separate residence where she has
jbeen living with her daughter from a previous marriage and which is
i

I located within one block of the Defendant's residence.

Tiffany

II Anderson has been renting the spare bedroom from time to time in
!|the residence.

Mr. Grumwald at no time moved any of his personal

I jeffects, clothing or possessions into any of the bedrooms located

ij
pin the residence and the only personal property that was stored at
'the residence was some snowmobiles in the Plaintiff's garage for a
i ;
ii

j;short period of time until Mr. Grumwald could find a location to
!!store the snowmobiles. Mr. Grumwald was working most of the time
i !

!:in 1994 and 1995 out of the State of Utah and during the periods of
''time he was staying in the state of Utah, he rented motel rooms and
-used the motel as his residence during the times he was in the
j:State of Utah.

Mr. Grumwald had a permanent residence in another

iiState for which all of his mail and other correspondence was mailed

h
.and at not time did he ever use the Plaintiff's residence as his
!

legal mailing address.
18.

The Court finds that the Defendant and Mr. Grumwald

! traveled on vacations during 1995, principally for fishing and
camping activities which were funded by Mr. Grumwald and during
which vacation periods those parties had sexual intercourse.

The

Plaintiff testified that during 1995 she had gone on vacations with
8

other male friends and had dated other persons other than Mr.
Grumwald.

The Court finds that Mr. Grumwald did maintain a

residence in the State of Utah outside of Plaintiff's residence,
and according to the undisputed testimony only stayed at the
Plaintiff's residence for possibly one evening over one night on
sporadic occasions.

During periods of time when Mr. Grumwald was

out-of-state and residing out-of-state, the Plaintiff had allowed
Mr. Grumwald to park and store his vehicle at her residence and
observations of the vehicle by neighbors or employees of the
Defendant do not mean that Mr. Grumwald was staying as a guest with
Ithe Plaintiff.
j

19.

The Court finds that Mr. Grumwald did not maintain a

Ijpermanent residence in the State of Utah, but that while he was

i'
j!here working for Ames Construction Company, on occasion while there
lias a guest, he used the telephone and utilities without paying any
ij
I!of the expenses for occasional use, assisted the Plaintiff's
'!

j; children

with

their

homework,

parked

his

vehicles

there on

II
iSovernight

occasions,

engaged

in sexual

intercourse

with the

i!
jJPlaintiff on numerous occasions throughout the calendar year 1995
land to the date

of trial

and was observed

both

inside the

! iPlaintiff's residence and outside working in the yard and in the
! iPlaintiff's garage on numerous occasions by the Defendant, his
employees and others who resided in and around the neighborhood
;

where Plaintiff's residence was located and that in his job he
traveled out of state extensively, principally in Idaho and Nevada.

20.

The Court finds that the claim of the Defendant for

termination of and reimbursement to him of alimony for that period
on grounds of cohabitation should be denied, the Court specifically
finding that the Defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that Plaintiff has resided with a person of the
opposite sex since the date of the parties' separation and that the
Plaintiff was paid directly out of the profits of the business and
not by the Defendant.

Further this was the only benefit received

by the Plaintiff from the business during separation from her 50%
ownership interest in the business.
21.

The Court finds and the record will reflect that the

Plaintiff filed during the course of the trial a motion to amend
Plaintiff's Complaint to include a claim for attorney's fees on the
various grounds including concealment of assets from the Court
supported by a detailed breakdown of legal fees in Exhibit 38, the
Court finds that the amendment is proper and should be granted.
The Defendant has- withheld assets from consideration of the Court
by not cashing certain checks, but by placing them in a file or
drawer to be cashed after the divorce became final, the Court
noting however, that it is difficult due to the nature of the
conduct to determine the amount involved; the Court finds that the
rates and fees charged by Plaintiff's counsel in connection with
his effort to determine all of the assets of the business and the
difficulty in doing so by reason of Defendant's conduct, it is fair
and reasonable and that the Court should order Defendant to pay to
10

the Plaintiff as and for attorney's fees the sum of $10,000.00 and
costs of $90.00 for the transcript; $398.00 for the deposition of
the Defendant and the filing fee.

Evidence was introduced from

several witnesses discovered and called by the Plaintiff that the
Defendant was hiding or concealing assets. Donna Chatwin testified
that she operated heavy equipment for Kelly's Excavating, LLC for
periods of time in May through August 1995 and November 1995
through January 1996 without pay.

During this period of time she

was never listed as an employee although she identified projects
she would be working without Mr. Mezenen ever being present.

She

testified that Mr. Mezenen ordered an employee to move property to
the garage at her residence from Kelly's Excavating, LLC on the
night before the appraisal was to take place for the purpose of the
Court hearing. She indicated that Mr. Mezenen told her that he hid
the property in her garage because he did not want the appraiser to
see the property.

She testified that there was a substantial

amount of property which filled her 3-car garage.

She also

testified that there were uncashed checks which she saw in the file
drawer of Kelly's Excavating, LLC and that Mr. Mezenen said that he
was going to use in the future to pay off any divorce settlement
with Linda Mezenen.

Donna Chatwin testified that she worked on a

project and that when a check was made out to Kelly's Excavating,
LLC, Mr. Mezenen told her to tear up the check and to obtain
another check which evidence was supported by the person that wrote
the check. Mr. Mezenen admitted that he did receive a check for a
11

specific project and that the check was turned over to Gary
Fielding without being accounted for in the books and records of
the business- Donna Chatwin testified that there were invoices for
projects upon which she worked that did not coincide with the date
on which

she recalled

working

the projects-

Donna

Chatwin

identified a job for Mary Williams for which heavy equipment had to
be moved from Provo, Utah at company expense for digging footings
and other work which the Defendant

failed to report on the

accounting information required by Court Order.
Kelly

Mezenen,

admitted

that

the

amount

of

The Defendant,
the project

of

approximately $1,000.00 was converted to an alleged verbal trade
which was never disclosed to any of the accountants preparing the
books

and

records

for

Court

examination during the trial.

and

only

revealed

upon cross-

The Defendant wrote off an account

receivable from Tom Biesinger as a bad debt without reporting to
any person until discovered during trial that he had taken a camp
trailer in trade for the account receivable which he falsely
reported during trial as an uncollectible.
22.
testimony

The Court finds after extensive consideration of the
offered

by

Plaintiff's

expert

Robin

Baster

and

Defendant's expert Merrill Norman with respect to the valuation of
the business of Kelly's Excavating, LLC that while Mr. Baster
indicated the outside limit of the value of the business to be in
the neighborhood of $440,000, he offered no opinion as to its
actual fair market value at the time of trial. The Court finds on
12

the other hand, that Mr. Norman determined the value of the
business to be approximately $112,000, which testimony the Court
finds is more credible and has a more sound basis in the facts of
this case and as such the Court finds the business of Kelly's
Excavating, LLC has a value of $112,000, and further that all of
the assets of the business as found by Mr. Norman to be a part of
the business and should be awarded to the Defendant as his sole and
separate property without claim from the Plaintiff.
23.

The Court finds and the files and records herein will

reflect that the plaintiff seeks reimbursement for one-half of all
net income shown on the books and records of the business since the
parties' separation in September of 1994, less the amount that she
has received in temporary alimony.

With respect to Plaintiff's

claim, the Court finds there is no cash fund from which the
calculated undistributed profits could be paid to the Plaintiff and
that if any cash exists in the company or accounts receivable, such
was included as a basis for Mr. Norman's calculation of the worth
of the business.

The Court further finds that the evidence is

established that all monies that have been withdrawn from the
company since the date of separation of the parties is accounted
for either in draws which the Defendant has received and which
represent a reasonable salary or in amounts paid to the Plaintiff
as

alimony.

As

such,

the

Court

finds

that

there

are

no

undistributed net profits to which the Plaintiff would be entitled
and her claim therefore should be denied.
13

24.

The Court finds that prior to the marriage of the

parties, and by their stipulation, a lot in Duchesne, Utah claimed
by the Defendant is his pre-marital property and should be awarded
to him as his sole and separate property without claim from the
Plaintiff.
25.

The Court finds that since the parties' marriage, they

acquired a lot known as the New Haven Lot with a fair market value
of $19,000 which should be awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and
separate

property

without

claim

from

the

Defendant

and the

Defendant be required to pay any obligation to his parents.
26.
the

The Court finds that the parties acquired a lot known as

Bagley

lot which

is

included

in the

assets of Kelly's

Excavating, LLC to be awarded to the Defendant as his sole and
separate property and as such the Plaintiff's claim thereto should
be denied.
27.

The Court finds that the parties maintained a safe in

their marital residence and that during the course of their
marriage, various amounts of cash were placed into and withdrawn
from the safe.

While the evidence on the amount in the safe at

various times was in dispute, the Court finds that at the time of
the separation of the parties, there was approximately $19,000 in
the parties safe which was accumulated during the marriage by
buying and selling property and savings.

The Court finds in

addition, that said amount has been substantially used by the

14

Defendant and therefore awards that sum and amount to him as his
sole and separate property without claim from the Plaintiff.
28.

The Court finds that during the parties' association and

subsequent marriage, they acquired a residence and real property on
Bagpiper Circle in Salt Lake County and completed remodeling and
repairs to that property including the construction of a shop
adjacent thereto from which the business of Kelly's Excavating, LLC
is conducted.

The Court further finds that the parties stipulated

as to the equity in that property and the payment to the Plaintiff
of her portion thereof.

Specifically, the Court finds that the

Defendant paid $5,800 of pre-marital funds as a down payment on the
Bagpiper residence which should be returned to him and that the
Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff $12,700 as her share of the
balance of the equity in the Bagpiper residence.

As per the

parties' stipulation, her equity calculated at $12,700, less $5,800
or a net equity of $6,900 should be paid by the Defendant to the
Plaintiff within ninety (90) days following the entry of the Decree
of Divorce herein.
29.

The Court finds that the parties had pre-marital property

or property acquired by them since their separation with their
separate funds and awards such property as follows:
a.

To the Plaintiff:

The vehicle she is currently

driving and a couch which she brought into the marriage.
b.

To the Defendant: A Certificate of Deposit at First

Security Bank in the approximate sum of $13,000, a Kenwood
15

stereo and speakers, a quilt from Defendant's son Derek's
great-grandmother, tackle boxes, canner, 1972 Chevrolet truck
and a 1987 Corvette automobile.
30.

The Court finds after reviewing the parties' claims as to

personal property as specifically set forth in Exhibits D-15, D-16,
D-17 and P-3 6, that the Plaintiff has personal property with a
value of approximately

$6,000 and the Defendant has personal

property with a value of approximately $10,000. The Court that it
is fair, just and equitable that each of the parties be awarded
that property currently in their possession free and clear of any
claim from the other.
31.

The Court finds that the parties have made personal loans

to two acquaintenances and that there is an amount due the parties
from a Mr. Steele the sum of $2,600 and from a Mr. Fielding, the
sum of $1,296.00 which the Court finds should be divided equally
between the parties at such time as they are collected and paid.
32.

The

Court

finds

that

there

are

various

debts and

obligations associated with Kelly's Excavating, LLC which should be
assumed and paid by the Defendant as well as obligations from the
Defendant to his parents which he should assume, pay, discharge and
hold the Plaintiff harmless from. The Court finds in addition that
each of the parties should be ordered to pay those obligations and
debts incurred by that party since their separation in the summer
of 1994.
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33.

The Court finds that while there is a significant dispute

between the parties as to their rights, duties and obligations in
connection with federal and state individual income tax returns,
that it is fair, just and equitable that the parties should file
individual state and federal income tax returns for 1994 and 1995
each having the benefit of pre-paid taxes as would be permitted
under applicable law for equal owners of the business of Kelly's
Excavating, LLC.

Further, the Court finds that if the parties so

agree, they may file such returns on a married, filing jointly
basis.
34.

The Court finds that the award of property to the

Plaintiff herein totals $2 5,000 and to the Defendant herein, the
sum of $141,000. It is therefore fair, just and equitable that the
Defendant be required to pay to the Plaintiff $58,000 to equalize
the property distribution.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now
concludes as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
concludes as follows:
1.

That the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter

hereof and the parties hereto.
2.

That Plaintiff is entitled to be awarded a Decree of

Divorce from Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences
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and that such should become final upon its entry as provided by
law.
3.

That each of the parties should be ordered to execute

such deeds, conveyances, bills of sale and other documents as may
be necessary to transfer the property awarded by the Court to the
party entitled thereto and to implement the terms hereof.
4.

That the Court should make and enter its Decree of

Divorce accordingly.
DATED this

<$

day of-X^^^rfSHL'^fiSe.

FRANK G^ N O E L ^
District^ £6iiix Judge"

APPROVED THIS

RANDALI1 GAIT!
Attorney fo

7

*> / DAY OF AUGUST 1996.

ntiff
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Defendant

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DECREE OF DIVORCE

LINDA MEZENEN,
Plaintiff, :
v.
:

Civil No. 944903679 DA

:

Judge Frank G. Noel

KELLY MEZENEN,
Defendant.
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial pursuant
to notice before the undersigned, one of the Judges of the aboveentitled Court .commencing on January 30, 1996 and continuing
thereafter on January 31, 1996, May 20, 1996 and May 21, 1996. The
Plaintiff Linda Mezenen appeared in person and by and through her
attorney Randall Gaither. The Defendant Kelly Mezenen appeared in
person and by and through his attorney Clark W. Sessions.

The

Court heard and considered the testimony of the parties, various
witnesses, including expert witnesses, received and considered
documentary evidence and heard the arguments and statements of
counsel.

The Court having fully considered the matter and having

heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law now
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded a Decree

of Divorce from the Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences, said Decree to become final upon its entry herein as
by law provided.
2.

That no alimony or other marital support or maintenance

is awarded to the Plaintiff herein.
3.

That the Defendant is not entitled to a refund of any

alimony paid under the temporary orders existing and in force
herein.
4.

That the claim of the Defendant therefore being based

upon the alleged cohabitation of the Plaintiff with a person of the
opposite sex be and the same is hereby denied.
5.

That prior to the marriage of the parties, the Defendant

acquired a lot in Duchesne, Utah which is hereby awarded to the
Defendant as his sole and separate property without claim from the
Plaintiff.
6.

That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her

sole and separate property the vehicle she is currently driving and
a couch she brought into the marriage. The Defendant be and he is
hereby awarded as his sole and separate property without claim from
the Plaintiff a certificate of deposit at First Security Bank in
the approximate amount of $13,000, Kenwood stereo and speakers, a
2

quilt from Defendant's son Derek's great-grandmother, tackle boxes,
canner, a 1972 Chevrolet truck and a 1987 Corvette. The parties be
and they are hereby awarded those items of personal property
currently

in

their

possession

other

than

as

hereinabove

specifically set forth.
7.

That the Defendant be and he is hereby awarded as his

sole and separate property all of the parties' right, title and
interest in and to Kelly's Excavating, LLC, including the business
and

all

assets

of

the

business as found

and

determined by

Defendant's expert Merrill Norman and that the claim of the
Plaintiff for undistributed net profits from Kelly's Excavating,
LLC be and the same is hereby denied.
8.

That the Defendant be and he is hereby awarded as his

sole and separate property all funds in the parties' safe in an
original amount of approximately $19,000 which amount has been
substantially used by the Defendant prior to the date hereof.
9.

That the New Haven building lot acquired by the parties

be and the same is hereby awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and
separate

property

without

claim

from

the

Defendant

and the

Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay any obligation
connected therewith to his parents.
10.

That the Bagpiper Circle marital residence acquired by

the parties during the course of their marriage be and the same is
Ihereby awarded to the Defendant as his sole and separate property

I
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parties less a deduction of $5,800 representing the Defendant's
pre-marital property, the Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to
pay to the Plaintiff the balance in the amount of $64,900.
15.

That the parties be and they are hereby ordered to file

individual federal and state income tax returns for the calendar
year 1994 and 1995 and that each should have the benefit of prepaid taxes such as would be permitted under law for equal owners of
the business of Kelly's Excavating, LLC.

If both parties can

agree, they are instructed to file such returns on a married,
filing jointly basis.
16.

That each of the parties shall assume, pay and discharge

their own costs and attorneys fees incurred herein, provided
however, the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as and for
attorney's fees from the Defendant the sum of $10,000.00 together
with costs of $513.00.
17.

That each of the parties be and they are hereby ordered

to execute such deeds, conveyances, bills of sale and other
documents as are necessary to transfer the property awarded by the
Court to the party entitled thereto and to cooperate each with the
other in implementing the terms hereof. ,

5

DATED this $~~ day o f j ^ g ^ £ ^ L »

APPROVED THIS

^

/DAY OF AUGUST 1996.

RANDALL GAITHER
Attorney /for Pla^Tntif]

6
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30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action
to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division
of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs,
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order
may include provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against a party if the courtfindsthe party is impecunious or enters
in the record the reason for not awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to
provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and
maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the other
party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in thefinalorder
or judgment.

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and visitation — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obhgations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
joint debts, obhgations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Parts 4 and 5.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation

30-3-5
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schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation.
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves,
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at
the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not forseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this
subsection.
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(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial
ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights
are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is cohabitating with another person.
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Clark W. Sessions
Dean C. Andreasen
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, 13th Floor
2 01 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2215
Linda Mezenen,
Plaintiff, Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
v.
Case No. 960652-CA
Kelly Mezenen,
Defendant, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
Dear Counsel:
The record index on this appeal was filed in this court. The record
remains on file with the trial court for your use in preparing your brief.
The purpose of this letter, therefore, is to set the briefing schedule.
Pursuant to Rules 13 and 26, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
appellant's brief must be served and filed on or before July 17, 1997. This
due date takes into consideration the three days mailing provision of Rule
22(d) .
Parties are advised to refer to Rules 24, 26, and 27, Utah R. App. P.,
for content and format requirements. These requirements are strictly
enforced, and the brief may be returned pursuant to Rule 2 7(d) if not properly
prepared.
Please be reminded that in civil cases where the record, excluding any
transcripts, totals 3 00 pages or more, all parties must file with the clerk of
the trial court, within 10 days after briefing is completed, a joint or
separate designation of those papers referred to in their respective briefs.
Only those designated papers, and those papers identified in Rule 11(d)(2)(B)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, will be transmitted to this court by
the clerk of the trial court.
Failure to perfect an appeal at any time during the appeal process may
result in dismissal of the appeal.
Sincerely,
/

,
/

Susan Willis
Deputy Court Clerk
PanHaT 1
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